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Abstract
This article analyses the effects of non-performing loans (NPLs hereafter) and financial (in)stability on 
banking competition in the Eurozone lending markets. Our results suggest that NPLs increase margin-
al costs and the degree of competition in banking markets. This phenomenon is economically more 
significant for non-listed than for listed banks. The results are robust to any endogeneity due to the 
impact of the economic downturn and the sovereign debt crisis on the growth of NPLs.
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1. Introduction
Until the onset of the financial crisis of 2008, the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
remained relatively stable. From then on, the bad loan portfolios of European banks em-
barked on the same downward trend as the macroeconomic environment.1 At the time of writ-
ing this paper, the NPL problem is concentrated in the so-called peripheral countries of the 
Eurozone. According to data published by the European Banking Authority (EBA), Eurozone 
bank balance sheets are still heavily weighed down by bad loans which are slowing down the 
lending market, and threatening financial stability.2
Banks keeping large volumes of NPLs on their balance sheets may create doubts about their 
viability in the event of worsening macroeconomic conditions, and increase uncertainty about 
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their future profitability and asset value. Such banks are exposed to negative risk perception 
by market players, which could face them with costlier financing and a marginal cost increase 
(Chiesa and Mansilla-Fernández, 2018 a, b). On the demand side, adverse macro-economic 
conditions, the sovereign debt crisis, and the deleveraging of the real sector may have contrib-
uted to lowering the price of loans. Analysing the market, one would expect banks affected by 
an increase in bad loans to reduce lending and narrow their mark-ups. In specific terms, the 
first question posed by this paper is: Can it be proven that bad loans and, by extension financial 
(in)stability, may affect the level of competition between banks in the lending market? To date, 
the financial literature has presented various conclusions as to the repercussions of the level of 
competition on financial stability (e. g., Boyd and Nicoló, 2005; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 
2010; Jiménez et al., 2013; IJtsma et al., 2017) As far as we know, this is one of the first studies 
to demonstrate that financial stability can affect the level of competition. 
In second place, this paper investigates whether access to capital markets can mitigate 
the effects of the transmission mechanism described above. In specific terms, the research 
question could be formulated as follows: Do bad loans have the same effect on the level of 
competition in listed as in non-listed banks? The literature cited above reveals that larger 
banks –of the type sometimes described as “too big to fail” (TBTF)– and systemic banks tend 
to accumulate higher levels of risk than smaller ones (Cai et al., 2018; Salas and Saurina, 
2002; Stern and Feldman, 2004). This paper considers the role of capital management in as-
sessing levels of competition.3 Listed banks have greater market access capacity and greater 
potential to increase their capital base than is the case for non-listed banks. Non-listed banks 
should therefore face a higher marginal cost increase than listed banks. In line with previous 
studies (e. g., Accornero et al., 2017; Louzis et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2016), this paper meas-
ures the NPL ratio as the volume of NPLs over total loans to customers. Graph 1 illustrates 
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EVOLUTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NPL RATIO FOR 
LISTED VS. NON-LISTED BANKS
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Graph 1.a shows that the average NPL ratios of listed banks are higher than those of 
non-listed banks in the period preceding the financial crisis of 2007. The slope of the time 
series reveals that listed banks generate NPLs at a faster rate than non-listed banks. Graph 1.b 
displays the distribution of the NPL ratio before (2002Q1-2007Q2) and after the onset of the 
financial crisis (2007Q3-2016Q4) in the form of a box and whisker plot. As the graph shows, 
the median listed bank holds a higher stock of NPLs than the average non-listed bank. 
The empirical analysis in this paper uses a panel of high-frequency data drawn from 
Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus (Bureau van Dijk) containing 388 Eurozone banks for the 
period 2002 to 2016. The panel is completed with market and macroeconomic data drawn 
from the Thomson Reuters Datastream. With respect to the variables used in the economet-
ric analysis, financial stability is calculated using the Z-score indicator as employed in the 
financial literature to assess the inverse probability of bank default  (Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Schaeck et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Köhler, 2015). In line with previous studies 
(Cruz-García et al., 2017, 2018; Carbó et al., 2009; Maudos and de Guevara, 2004, 2007), the 
degree of competition between banks is calculated using the Lerner index, which measures 
bank's level of market power by relating price to marginal cost. As a robustness check, this 
Source: Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus (Bureau van Dijk). The NPL ratio is measured as 
the volume of loans to customers. Graph 1.a shows the evolution of the mean value of the NPL 
ratio for listed (solid line) and non-listed (broken line) banks. Graph 1.b is a box and whisker 
plot of the distribution of the NPL ratio for listed and non-listed banks. The whiskers show the 
upper and lower limits of the distribution. The line through each box indicates the median, i.e., 
the 50th percentile of the distribution. The upper (lower) boundaries of the box are the upper 
(lower) quartiles.
	
(b) Distribution of the NPL ratio
(Continued.)
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result is tested against the Boone (2008) indicator which measures the temporary impact of 
marginal cost on the bank’s share in the lending market. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimator with fixed effects is used for the panel data, and the Instrumental Variables (IV) 
estimator is used to check whether the final result is conditioned by the effect of crisis-relat-
ed factors on the NPL level. This study contributes to the research by bringing to light that 
higher NPL ratios increase banks’ marginal cost and also lending market competition. The 
results suggest, furthermore, that non-listed banks are more vulnerable than listed banks to 
changes in NPLs.
The remainder of the paper is organized in five sections. Section two discusses the re-
lated literature. Section three presents the hypotheses, defines the database and describes the 
empirical model and study variables. Section four provides a discussion of the results and the 
paper closes with a concluding section.
2. Literature review
There now follows a discussion on the theoretical basis for the questions to be addressed 
and the methodology to be used in this research, and an explanation of how the study fits into 
the existing body of research. 
The first question to be addressed is whether NPLs and financial (in)stability are deter-
mining factors of the levels of competition in banking markets. Until now, the economics lit-
erature has focused on the level of banking competition as a determining factor for financial 
stability and the amount of risk assumed by banks (e. g., Allen and Gale, 2004; Coccorese, 
2004; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010).4 Although these studies share the common de-
nominator of treating banking competition and financial stability as a trade-off, their conclu-
sions are ambiguous. On the one hand, the “competition fragility” predicts that any increase 
in the level of competition will reduce mark-ups and lower the franchise value of banks, 
causing them to increase their risk taking (IJtsma et al., 2017). The intuition behind this 
reasoning is simple: banks operating in relatively non-competitive markets are more able to 
identify the more solvent borrowers; and this allows them to increase their interest margin, 
capital ratios and franchise value (Coccorese, 2004). The “competition stability” view, on 
the other hand, predicts that banks operating in low competition settings raise loan prices to 
relatively uncompetitive levels, thus increasing their customers' probability of default, and 
thereby their own portfolio risk, while posing a threat to financial stability (Boyd and Nicoló, 
2005). The empirical literature demonstrates that there is a parabolic relationship between 
banking competition and financial stability (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Liu et al., 
2013). This study contributes to the literature by disentangling the transmission mechanism 
through which the opposite occurs: that is, financial (in)stability determines banking compe-
tition. The process is explained by applying standard industrial organization models to bank-
ing markets (e. g., VanHoose, 2017). The literature leaves open the question of estimating the 
thresholds above which NPLs become pernicious for the proper functioning of the banking 
sector. With respect to the first issue, in a study conducted on a sample of Chinese banks, 
Zhang et al. (2016) report a threshold of around 4.8 %, above which banks start to exhibit 
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moral hazard-type behaviour; sustaining future losses as a consequence (Hellmann et al., 
2000).5 Beyond this threshold, bank profitability suffers because the resources for lending 
are diminished (e. g., Angelini, 2018; Angelini et al., 2017). Banks address this problem by 
laying up insolvency provisions as a safety net in case they need to write off some or all of 
their doubtful loans (Mohaddes et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2016). The size and evolution of 
NPL ratios are observable data. Banks with rising NPL trends are perceived among financial 
market players as more being risk-taking than the rest (Accornero et al., 2017). Bank borrow-
ers and capital investors, alike, may question the viability of such banks and hence demand 
non-diversifiable risk compensation (e. g., Chiesa and Mansilla-Fernández, 2018 a, b). In oth-
er words, if banks find it harder to access funding (Aiyar et al., 2015; Chiesa and Mansil-
la-Fernández, 2018 a), it can be assumed that the price inputs used for lending will increase, 
and there will be a vertical shift in the marginal cost curve (VanHoose, 2017; Degryse and 
Ongena, 2008).
The empirical literature studies whether the NPL transmission mechanism is static, i.e., 
measured in levels; or dynamic, i. e., measured as changes in the amount of NPLs on the 
balance sheet. This paper is closely related with that of Accornero et al. (2017) where it is 
shown that “change” in the NPL level rather than the NPL ratio per se, is the transmission 
mechanism through which the loan supply decreases. Meanwhile, Bending et al. (2014) use a 
dynamic approach to show how an increase in NPLs reduces the supply of loans to non-finan-
cial firms. In line with the streams of research discussed above, this study uses the dynamic 
approach to test whether increases in the NPL ratio work as a transmission mechanism affect-
ing competition in the Eurozone banking markets. The results confirm that an increase in the 
variation of the NPL ratio causes a marginal cost increase for banks, but provide no empirical 
evidence that an increase (decrease) in the NPL ratio (as an indicator of financial stability) 
has any impact on the price of loans.6 In a monopolistic market setting, the size of the mark-
up is limited by the fact that banks have less room for manoeuvre; which is a symptom of 
higher competition. The results of this study suggest, furthermore, that an upward trend in 
NPLs reduces lending market concentration. 
The second question that this study will try to answer is whether this effect is more 
significant in the case of listed or non-listed banks. As far as we are aware, this is one of 
the first studies to investigate the repercussions of financial (in)stability on banking market 
competition, while taking into consideration whether the banks are listed in secondary bank-
ing markets.7 In seeking an answer to this question, this paper finds its basis in the literature 
highlighting the role of bank size, in particular the size of banks deemed “too-big-to-fail” 
(TBTF), as a transmission mechanism leading banks to engage in risky trading and increase 
their stock of NPLs (Cai et al., 2018; Salas and Saurina, 2002; Stern and Feldman, 2004). 
Stern and Feldman (2004) show that, in comparison with non-listed banks, TBTF banks are 
relatively less disciplined by their stakeholders, who are confident that such entities are cov-
ered by government protection schemes –i. e., deposit guarantees or the possibility of rescue 
in the event of failure (Boyd and Graham, 1998; Nier and Baumann, 2006). The seminal 
work by Boyd and Gertler (1994) shows that a policy benefiting the big US banks caused an 
increase in NPL levels. In a similar vein, Louzis et al. (2012), studying a sample of Greek 
banks, show that fulfilment, or otherwise, of the TBTF hypothesis depends on each loan cat-
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egory. Using the principal-agent theory, Rud et al. (2018) show that the bank (the agent) and 
the borrower (the principal) are more closely aligned in a low competition setting, where the 
entity has less risk exposure. However, the findings of Cai et al. (2018) show that syndicated 
loans, despite being extended by a group of banks, can increase systemic risk due to the ef-
fect of interconnections between banks during periods of economic recession. This research 
contributes to the economics literature by demonstrating that the effect of an NPL increase 
on marginal cost is economically more significant in non-listed than in listed banks. This can 
be explained by the fact that access to capital markets is more restricted for non-listed than 
for listed banks. By incorporating risk, non-listed banks would be accepting harsher financ-
ing conditions than those faced by listed banks, thus increasing their input costs. Non-listed 
banks would therefore have less lending capacity and suffer greater losses in terms of market 
share and mark-up than listed banks.
3. Hypotheses, data and methodology
3.1. Hypotheses
The purpose of this research is to analyse the effect of the NPL ratio on competition 
between banks, making a distinction between listed and non-listed banks. Based on the re-
viewed literature, the following hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 1.—The NPL ratio increases competition in markets for bank loans.
Hypothesis 2.—The NPL ratio has a more significant impact on the level of competition 
for non-listed than for listed banks. 
3.2. The data
The main sources of data for this study are Bankscope and Orbis bank Focus (Bureau 
van Dijk). The database is formed from quarterly data for Eurozone Banks for the period 
2002Q1-2016Q4.8 The initial sample consisted of consolidated state data on commercial 
banks, savings banks and loan cooperatives. All the financial entities included in the sample 
provide data from 1st January to 31st December. Because Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus 
make a distinction between listed and non-listed entities, a variable is extracted to allow the 
sample to be split into these two groups. Banks are selected at the highest possible level of 
consolidation, usually as banking groups, in order to avoid double-entry problems. Those that 
do not form banking groups are kept as individual entities. The final sample consists of 388 
financial entities, of which 86 are listed and 302 are non-listed.
The sample years are considered representative because they include the years preceding 
the financial crisis, when banks were extending more loans and assuming higher levels of risk 
(2002Q1-2007Q2), as well as the years of the banking and sovereign debt crisis (2007Q3-
2016Q4).
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The data are expressed in thousands of Euros and deflated by the harmonized consum-
er price index (HCPI). Inconsistent observations, such as zero total assets, negative equity 
values, and zero number of workers, were removed from the sample. Finally, a panel of data 
comprising 23,265 observations was obtained.
The macroeconomic time series data for each country were drawn from the Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. The banking data and macroeconomic data were then combined into a 
single panel.
Table 1 contains the definitions of the study variables, which are winsorized at 1 % to 
remove any outliers that might skew the results.
3.3. Measures of banking competition
This study uses the Lerner index and Boone’s (2008) indicator as measures of the degree 
of banking market competition. Both these indicators use marginal cost as the main variable.
3.3.1. The Lerner Index
This study uses the risk-adjusted Lerner index as a measure of the degree of banking mar-
ket competition in the Eurozone. This index measures the bank’s mark-up capacity as a per-
centage of the price and can vary between zero and one, where Lernerit = 1 in the case of per-
fect monopoly, Lernerit = 0 in the case of perfect competition, and, exceptionally, Lernerit < 0 
in the case of non-optimal performance, in which case the bank must resort to mark-down. The 
Lerner index is calculated as follows:
  (1)
where the subscripts i and t denote the bank and the time period, respectively. The variable 
Pit is calculated as the ratio of financial and non-financial revenue to total assets. MCit is 
the marginal cost. Given that banks take the risk premium into account when setting loan 
prices, a higher mark-up does not necessarily indicate a lower degree of competition in the 
banking market, and may be due to an increase in the risk cost (Cruz-García et al., 2018). 
Thus, if marginal cost were estimated in the conventional manner, the Lerner index estimates 
could be biased. For this reason, the risk-adjusted marginal cost is estimated as follows (see 
Martín-Oliver et al., 2006; Jiménez et al., 2013):9
  (2)
where rt is the risk-free interest rate measured as the quarterly average of the three-month Eu-
ribor. PDit is the probability of default measured as the quotient between impairment loss on 
financial assets and the loan volume.10 LGD is the value of the loans the bank will be unable 
to recoup in the event of default. Following Jiménez et al. (2013), LGD is assigned the value 
�������� � ��� � ������� 	
���� � �� � ���� � ���1� ���� � ��� 	
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45 %, as recommended in the bank capital rules laid down by the Basel Banking Supervision 
Committee.
3.3.2. The Boone (2008) indicator
The Boone (2008) indicator is another measure of banking competition which is used 
as a robustness check for the Lerner index. The Boone indicator assumes that more efficient 
banks will gain a greater share of the market and increase their profits at the expense of less 
efficient entities. In other words, competition improves (worsens) the profitability of more 
(less) efficient Banks. It is estimated by means of the following expression:
������ ������
 ln������ � �� � � � ����� � � ���� � ��� (3)
�������� ��������
where MSit is the lending market share for each bank measured as the ratio of the i bank’s 
volume of customer loans to total bank loans for country h in period t. The term MCit denotes 
the marginal cost as defined in the section above. The matrix Dt includes discrete time varia-
bles to control for factors common to all banks within each specific period. Coefficient βt is 
the Boone indicator. Negative values (βt < 0) mean that more cost-efficient banks gain market 
share from comparatively less efficient banks. A large negative value of βt is indicative of a 
relatively more competitive market, while values higher than zero (β0 > 0) mean that high-
er marginal costs increase the bank’s market share. Heteroscedasticity can be overcome by 
means of a logarithmic transformation. 
3.4. Financial stability indicators: the NPL ratio and the Z-score
This study uses two measures of risk exposure: the NPL ratio (NPLit), and, as a robust-
ness check, the Z-score. The NPL ratio, calculated as the volume of NPLs over total customer 
loans, is the variable of interest. The Z-score, widely used in the literature on financial sta-
bility (e. g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Schaeck et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Köhler, 2015), 
is calculated as follows:
����� � ��� ��� � �� (4)��������
where ROAit is the profitability ratio measured as earnings before tax over total assets; CARit, 
is the capitalization ratio measured as equity capital over total assets; and σ (ROAit) is the 
standard deviation of ROA computed for a three-year rolling time window. A moving stand-
ard deviation is used to allow for time variability of the denominator.
The Z-score is interpreted as the decrease in the standard deviation of its ROA that would 
be required to absorb the bank’s equity capital. In other words, the Z-score is the inverse 
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3.5. Empirical specification 
This section presents a discussion on strategies for identifying and testing hypotheses 
regarding the effects of NPLs on lending market structure.
The empirical methodology for this study is based on the following Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimator with fixed effects for panel data: 
  (5)
where yit is the dependent 
��� � �� � �������,��� � ��,���� � � �� � ��� 	
 variable for the following indicators. The first is the Lerner index 
(Lernerit), which is computed as in expression (1). The second, used as a robustness check, 
is the Boone (2008) indicator, computed as shown in expression (3).
For the explanatory variables, the indicator of interest is the quarterly change in the 
one-period lagged NPL ratio (∆NPLit) computed as the volume of NPLs over total customer 
loans. Accornero et al. (2017) show that it is not the NPL ratio, per se, but its variation that 
determines loan demand. Taking this finding from the literature into account, a test is per-
formed to determine whether a change in the NPL ratio has a negative impact on banking 
market power. This is followed with a robustness check in which this variable is replaced 
with quarterly change in the natural logarithm of the Z-score (∆ln(Zi, t−1)), computed as in-
dicated in expression (4). The matrix X'i, t–1 captures the following control variables lagged 
by one period. Bank size (Dimi, t−1) is measured as the natural logarithm of the bank’s total 
assets. The income structure ratio (INCi, t−1) is computed as the ratio of non-interest earnings 
(operating earnings minus the interest margin) to operating earnings and is a measure of 
bank revenue diversification. The efficiency ratio (EFFi, t−1) is calculated as operating costs 
over operating income and is used to control for bank (in)efficiency. Financial leverage 
(LEVi, t−1) is computed as the ratio of total assets to total equity.11 The Herfindhal-Hirschman 
concentration index , which indicates the level of concentration in the bank lend-
ing market, is calculate
,  
 d as the squared sum of the market shares of banks in every country 
h. Formally, the Herfindhal-Hirschman index is calculated as ,  , where 
MSit is the lending market share of each bank in the country in which it operates (h). Stand-
ard Industrial Organization models predict equivalence between the Lerner index and the 
HHI, proportional to market contestability and inverse price elasticity of demand. At the 
empirical level, however, the HHI and the Lerner index can yield diverse results if controls 
for the input-output patterns of regional markets are not included (Carbó-Valverde et al., 
2003, 2009; Carbó et al., 2009). Previous studies have used the HHI as a determinant of 
the Lerner index, although the ratio can become increasingly endogenous with growing 
market contestability (see, Carbó-Valverde and Rodríguez-Fernández, 2007; Maudos and 
de Guevara, 2004, 2007).
Macroeconomic variables are then included to control for business cycle effects on mar-
ket structure. GDPht denotes the quarterly rate of change in the gross domestic product of 
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every country (h); while the discrete variable, Crisist, which is included to control for poten-
tial structural change, is assigned a value of one from the onset of the financial crisis onwards 
(t ≥ 2007Q3), and zero otherwise.
Finally, to control for possible endogeneity issues in the drivers of loan default, the NPL 
ratio (∆NPLit) is instrumentalized with the macro-economic factors discussed in section 2: 
 ����  (6)�� � �� � �������� � ������� � ���
where 
 
 is the predicted value of the NPL ratio based on the selected instruments; 
UNEMht is the unemployment rate for each country; CDSht denotes the 10-year sovereign 
CDS value for each country, which is used as the country risk proxy. Since Thomson Reuters 
Datastream data on this variable are only available from 2008 onwards, the second part of the 
exercise covers the crisis period (2008Q1-2016Q4) exclusively. ϖit is the error component of 
the regression equation. This second exercise is approached using the instrumental variables 
(IV) estimation method. 
4. Results
Panel B shows the mean differences between the pre-crisis period (2002Q1-2007Q2) and 
the post-crisis period (2007Q32016Q4). These were obtained using the time variable, Crisist. 
The mean differences for the Lerner index (Lernerit) reject the null hypothesis (H1: Crisist(0)  − Crisist(1) < 0) thus indicating a decline in competition following the onset of the crisis.
With respect to the competition indicators, the Lerner index (Lernerit) shows an average of 
0.31, oscillating between 0.10 and 0.50; and the Boone indicator (Bht) an average value of 
tion in the variable (∆Ln(Zit)), meanwhile, shows an average of 0.007, oscillating between -5.89 
and 4.96. Finally, the average value of the dummy variable Lit suggests that 22.18 % of the banks 
included in the sample are listed; which means that the mean individual is a non-listed entity.
sis are summarized in table 2. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the study variables. 
-0.16, oscillating in the range of -0.29 to -0.05. The Herfindhal-Hirschman index ,  
for the lending market  
 
,  shows an average of 0.37, oscillating between approximately 
0.001 and 1.00. Marginal cost (MCit) shows an average of 0.03, oscillating between 0.01 and 
0.09; while the average price of loans (Pit) is 0.04, oscillating between 0.01 and 0.14. As far 
as the financial stability variables are concerned, the NPL ratio (NPLit) shows an average of 
8.21 % for the Eurozone as a whole, oscillating approximately between 0.01 % and 54.55 %. 
The quarterly variation in the NPL ratio (∆NPLit) shows an average of 0.0034, oscillating 
between -0.05 and 0.07. The natural logarithm of the Z-score (Ln(Zit)) shows an average of 
1.69, oscillating between -5.89 and 4.96, in line with previous findings. The quarterly varia-
4.1. Descriptive statistics and parametric tests
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Likewise, the parametric test rejects the null for the Boone indicator (Bht) thereby 
confirming a decline in competition in the Eurozone banking markets during the post-cri-
sis period (H1: Crisist(0) − Crisist(1) < 0). This is due to a significant drop in marginal 
cost (MCit) and the price of loans (H1: Crisist(0) − Crisist(1) > 0), and to an increase in the 
lending market concentration indices (MSit and ,  
 
 
 ) during the post-crisis period (H1: 
Crisist(0) − Crisist(1) < 0). The results for the financial stability variables support a relatively 
higher NPL ratio (NPLit) for the post-crisis period. The mean difference results also enable 
rejection of the null hypothesis for the quarterly growth of the NPL ratio (∆NPLit) in favour 
of the post-crisis period (H1: Crisist(0) − Crisist(1) < 0). The results for the financial stability 
indicator (Ln(Zit)) remain qualitatively consistent with the those reported above, enabling 
rejection of the null hypothesis in favour of the pre-crisis period for the level-based indicator 
(∆Ln(Zit)) (H1: Crisist(0) − Crisist(1) > 0). Analysis of the overall results of the parametric 
hypothesis test by sub-periods shows that the crisis:
ii.  Reduces competition in the bank lending markets of the Eurozone as a result of the 
banking integration processes carried out in several countries.12
ii.  Reduces financial stability because adverse macroeconomic conditions trigger an in-
crease in NPLs, leading to a drop in bank earnings, and, in some cases, even to losses.
4.2. The baseline regression
This section discusses the econometric results which prove hypothesis 1. Table 3 gives 
the regression coefficients for expression (5). The hypotheses for this study are tested using 
OLS regression analysis with fixed effects for panel data (columns (1)-(4)). The estimation 
results show that a 1 % increase of variation in the NPL ratio (∆NPLit) triggers significant 
reductions in the Lerner index (Lernerit) and the Boone indicator (of 0.75 % and 0.54 %, 
respectively). This result is robust to replacing ∆NPLit with the variation in the natural loga-
rithm of the Z-score (∆Ln(Zit)). The estimates suggest that a 1 % increase in ∆Ln(Zit) causes 
Lernerit and Bht to grow by 0.72 % and 0.26 % (p-value < 0,000), respectively. The results of 
this study show that a growing trend in the amount of risk held on bank balance sheets, due 
either to an increase in NPLs or to a lack of liquidity or a drop in earnings, has a positive 
impact on the degree of competition in the lending markets of the Eurozone. The control 
variables have the expected signs and significance levels.
The results reported above are robust to the inclusion of instrumental variables (IV), as 
shown in expression (6), to control for the effect of the economic crisis on the growth of the 
NPL ratio (e. g., Balgova et al., 2016, 2018; Buch et al., 2016; Ghosh, 2017; Podstawski and 
Velinov, 2018). The estimates of the instrumental variables are given in columns (5)-(8). The 
sign and magnitude of the IV estimator support the notion that the degree of competition in 
banking markets is sensitive to increases in the NPL ratio and to financial (in)stability. Fur-
thermore, the first-stage analysis fulfils initial expectations by confirming that the unemploy-
ment rate (UNEMh, t−1) and 10-year sovereign CDS (CDSht−1) drive NPL growth. 
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Table 3
THE EFFECTS OF BANK NPLs AND FINANCIAL STABILITY ON THE 
LEVEL OF COMPETITION
This table shows the results when a variation in financial stability, defined as the NPL ratio (NPLit) and the natural 
logarithm of the Z-score (Ln(Zit)), is regressed against the Lerner index (Lernerit) and the Boone indicator (Bht), as 
dependent variables. The regressions are estimated using high-frequency data. L   is a qualitative variable which is i i
equal to one if bank i is listed, and zero otherwise. Specifications (1), (2), (3) and (4) are estimated using the Ordi-
nary Least Squares (OLS) estimator for panel data with fixed effects for the period 2002Q1-2016Q4. Specifications 
(5), (6), (7) and (8) are estimated using the instrumental variables (VI) estimator for the period 2008Q1-2016Q4. The 
selected instruments are the NPL ratio (NPLit), the unemployment rate (UNEMh. t−1) and the 10-year sovereign CDS 
(CDS an test, under the null of eh. t ) lagged by one quarter for country h. Instruments validated by Sarg xogeneity, −1
checking the lack of correlation between the instruments and the error term of the main equation. All the regressions 
contain individual fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered by countries. *, **, ***, denote minimum 10 %, 
5 %, 1 % significance, respectively. 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ΔNPL -0.745***  -0.542***  -0.526*** -0.425***it
(0.088)  (0.129)  (0.089) (0.072)
ΔLn(Zit) 0.718*** 0.258** 0.517*** 0.397***
(0.086) (0.100) (0.083) (0.074)
Dim 0.433*** 0.478*** 0.315*** 0.341*** 0.499*** 0.473*** 0.453*** 0.536***i, t–1
(0.120) (0.163) (0.040) (0.039) (0.063) (0.061) (0.052) (0.065)
Dim2 -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.059*** -0.055*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.060***i, t–1
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
INC 0.628** 0.630** 0.117** 0.070* 0.641** 0.461* -0.436* -0.377*i, t–1
(0.209) (0.139) (0.042) (0.033) (0.181) (0.113) (0.121) (0.193)
EFF -0.424*** -0.429*** -0.306*** -0.311*** -0.445*** -0.448*** -0.425*** -0.414***i, t–1
(0.072) (0.073) (0.039) (0.066) (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052)
LEV -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.079***i, t–1
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007)
HHICr 0.639** 0.639** 0.538** 0.601** 0.621** 0.618** 0.616** 0.641**h, t–1
(0.187) (0.183) (0.134) (0.162) (0.140) (0.131) (0.134) (0.140)
(HHICr )2 -0.126*** -0.121*** -0.212*** 0.214*** -0.134*** -0.197*** -0.152*** -0.154***h, t–1
(0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
GDP 0.568** 0.511** 0.484** 0.452** 0.596*** 0.527*** -0.573*** -0.692***
ht
(0.124) (0.110) (0.189) (0.166) (0.117) (0.104) (0.113) (0.115)
INF -0.151*** -0.150** -0.116*** -0.109*** -0.152*** -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.152***
h, t–1
(0.028) (0.025) (0.004) (0.009) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024)
Crisis -0.092*** -0.099*** -0.074*** -0.076***
t
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
First step
UNEM 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.026***
h, t–1
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CDS 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
h, t–1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 5,160 5,160 5,160 5,160 5,160 5,160 5,160 5,160
Sargan test 
[p-value] 0.284 0.142 0.231 0.546
Wald test  
[p-value] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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4.3. Explaining the transmission mechanism
The next question to arise in the light of the above results concerns the mechanism 
through which variations in the NPL ratio and in financial (in)stability modify the level of 
banking market competition. Previous studies have shown that banks with relatively high 
NPL levels have opted to gamble for resurrection by giving riskier loans (e. g., Hellmann et 
al., 2000). This study contributes to the literature by analysing the effect of variations in the 
NPL ratio on banks’ marginal costs (MCit), loan prices (Pit) and shares in the lending market 
(MSit). Table 4 reports the OLS estimates for panel data with fixed effects.
Table 4
THE EFFECTS OF BANK NPLs AND FINANCIAL STABILITY ON MARGINAL COST,  
LOAN INTEREST RATES AND MAKET SHARE
This table shows the results when a variation in financial stability, defined as the NPL ratio (NPLit) and the natural 
logarithm of the Z-score (Ln(Zit)), regressed against marginal cost (MCit), loan price (Pit), and market share (MSit) 
as dependent variables. Specifications (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) are estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimator for panel data with fixed effects for the period 2002Q1-2016Q4. All the regressions contain indi-








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔNPLit 0.005** -0.065 -0.327***
(0.002) (0.049) (0.033)
ΔLn(Zit) -0.002** -0.001 0.315***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.029)
Dimi, t–1 -0.045*** -0.037*** 0.025* 0.028* 0.247*** 0.293***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.047) (0.042)
Dimi, t–1 0.021*** 0.017*** -0.001* -0.001* -0.534*** -0.523***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.052)
INCi, t–1 -0.035** -0.024** 0.064** 0.060** 0.210*** 0.245***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.024) (0.023) (0.055) (0.048)
EFFi, t–1 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.026** 0.016*** -0.238*** -0.228***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.009) (0.005) (0.075) (0.073)
LEVi, t–1 0.051*** 0.063*** -0.048** -0.043** -0.082*** -0.081***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011)
HHIh, t–1 -0.248*** -0.214*** 0.040** 0.036**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.014)
(HHIh, t–1)2 0.064*** 0.053** -0.034 0.036
(0.011) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025)
GDPht -0.211*** -0.227*** 0.088** 0.094*** 0.142** 0.156**
(0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.022) (0.083) (0.097)
INFh, t–1 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.002** 0.001** -0.085*** -0.087***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.016)
Crisist 0.037*** 0.037*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.155*** -0.171**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.076) (0.075)
N 5,160 5,160 5,160 5,160 5,160 5,160
Wald test
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Columns (1)-(2) give the estimates of the regression for banks’ marginal costs, which 
suggest that a variation in the NPL ratio (∆NPLit) increases the marginal cost by 0.005 % 
(p-value < 0.005). They also reveal that an increase in financial stability (∆Ln(Zit)), or, equiv-
alently, a reduction in the bank’s default risk, reduces the marginal cost by 0.002 %. It should 
be noted that data on the evolution of the NPL ratio and the default risk and profitability 
ratios are readily observable by the bank’s borrowers and investors. If these perceive the bank 
to be gradually increasing its risk ratio, they might compromise its future profitability and 
asset value by demanding more compensation for the extra non-diversifiable risk (Chiesa 
and Mansilla-Fernández, 2018 a, b). Put another way, the accumulation of risk increases the 
bank’s input costs, thereby increasing the marginal cost of loans. The diminishing demand 
trend may have put downward pressure on loan prices (BdE, 2017). The results of this study 
provide no empirical evidence to suggest that an increase in the NPL ratio had any effect on 
loan prices (Pit) [columns (3)-(4)]. This may be due to the influence of a reduction in the 
demand for loans resulting from the economic slowdown and the process of deleverage in the 
real sector (e. g., Balgova et al., 2016, 2018; Ghosh, 2017; BdE, 2017). Finally, the estimates 
shown in columns (5)-(6) confirm that an increase in bank NPLs reduces banks’ lending mar-
ket shares (MSit). An overall analysis of the results enables the conclusion that the accumula-
tion of risk on bank balance sheets, as shown by an increase in the NPL or default risk ratio, 
drives lending market competition by reducing cost efficiency. As a result, some banks suffer 
a loss of market share to more efficient banks, and thus see a reduction in their mark-up.
4.4. Listed vs. non-listed banks
This section discusses the statistics confirming hypothesis 2. The sample is split by cre-
ating a qualitative variable (Li) which takes the value one if the shares of bank i are listed 
in the secondary markets (Li = 1), and zero otherwise (Li = 0). Table 5 reports a paramet-
ric means test for the main study variables under the null hypothesis of equality between 
non-listed and listed banks (H0: Li(0) − Li(1) = 0). The data were also split into a pre-crisis 
period (2002Q1-2007Q2) and a post-crisis period (2007Q3-2016Q4). The test results indi-
cate that the differences in the Lerner index (Lernerit) between listed and non-listed banks 
emerge during the pre-crisis period, but fail to reject the null hypothesis for the crisis period. 
It is important to note that the test rejects the null for the marginal cost (MCit), thereby indi-
cating that non-listed banks are comparatively less efficient than listed banks during the crisis 
period (H1: Li(0) − Li(1) < 0).
According to the above results, the parametric test shows that listed banks are relatively 
larger (Dimit) and hold less risk (LEVit) than non-listed banks. Furthermore, the results for 
the NPL ratio (NPLit) suggest that the differences between the two types of bank arise after 
the onset of crisis, the mean value of this variable being higher for listed than for non-listed 
banks. Meanwhile, the difference-in-means test fails to reject the null hypothesis for the 
quarterly rate of variation in the NPL ratio (∆NPLit), thereby indicating that NPL growth 
is similar in both types of banks. However, the difference-in-means test reveals a relatively 
higher financial stability indicator (Ln(Zit)) for the non-listed than for the listed banks (H1: 
Li(0) − Li(1) > 0) during both periods, while failing to reject the null for the quarterly rate of 
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variation in the financial stability indicator (∆Ln(Zit)) (see Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis 
et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2018).13
Table 6 gives the results of a repeat econometric test, with separate regressions for listed 
(Li = 1) and non-listed (Li = 0) banks, aimed at checking for any significant differences in the 
coefficients for the two groups. The results shown in Panel A suggest that the impact of the 
NPL ratio on the level of banking competition (Lernerit) is economically more significant 
for listed than for non-listed banks. A robustness check including the natural logarithm of the 
Z-score (∆Ln(Zit)) as a regressor confirms these findings. The robustness of the above results 
is tested in eight alternative estimations, shown in Panel B, where Lernerit is replaced with 
Bht as the dependent variable. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the 
Lerner index. The results of the analysis of the transmission mechanism in Panel C confirm 
that bank NPLs and financial instability cause a greater increase in marginal cost (MCit) in 
non-listed banks than in those that are listed.
Table 5
PARAMETRIC MEANS TEST FOR LISTED VS. NON-LISTED BANKS
This table splits the sample into two groups of individuals: listed banks (Li = 1) and non-listed banks (Li = 0). The pa-
rametric test is conducted under the null hypothesis H0 = Li(0) − Li(1) = 0 for the pre-crisis period (2002Q1-2007Q2) 
and post-crisis period (2007Q3-2016Q4). All the variables are defined in Table 1. The coefficients are for the mean 
values, while the standard error is given in parentheses. The p-value of the Student-t statistic is shown in the third 
column of each period of analysis.





 = 1 p-value Li = 0 Li = 1 p-value
Lernerit 0.2514 0.2905 0.0470 0.3176 0.3307 0.2043
(0.0186) (0.0131) (0.0123) (0.0099)
MSit 0.2744 0.3137 0.0736 0.1749 0.2063 0.0007
(0.0159) (0.0212) (0.0059) (0.0079)
NPLit 0.0415 0.0465 0.1998 0.0845 0.0943 0.0194
(0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0035)
ΔNPLit 0.0027 -0.0019 0.0944 0.0030 0.0039 0.2953
(0.0032) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0007)
Ln(Zit) 2.0903 1.6142 0.0000 1.6491 1.5454 0.0061
(0.0425) (0.1353) (0.0206) (0.0324)
ΔLn(Zit) -0.0265 -0.0589 0.4549 0.0179 0.0021 0.4333
(0.1386) (0.2482) (0.0501) (0.0768)
MCit 0.0381 0.0386 0.4008 0.0163 0.0205 0.0246
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0017)
Pit 0.0518 0.0558 0.1354 0.0241 0.0305 0.0192
(0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0024)
Dimit 22.5387 24.0611 0.0000 22.8102 24.2896 0.0000
(0.0959) (0.1422) (0.0446) (0.0673)
INCit 0.3897 0.3884 0.4689 0.3711 0.3712 0.4904
(0.0089) (0.0132) (0.0040) (0.0063)
EFFit 0.3212 0.3096 0.1973 0.3358 0.3062 0.0000
(0.0045) (0.0076) (0.0027) (0.0037)
LEVit 16.1694 17.9097 0.0036 14.2135 16.0630 0.0000
(0.3921) (0.4699) (0.1858) (0.2501)
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Discussion.—The results of this study suggest that the examined transmission mecha-
nism is relatively more sensitive for non-listed than for listed banks. Previous research has 
shown that an accumulation of NPLs on a bank’s balance sheet reduces its profitability and 
asset value (Coccorese and Girardone, 2017; Zhang et al., 2016). Under current financial 
regulations, banks are required to hold a minimum capital buffer to fund new lending (Berger 
and Bouwman, 2013; Jiménez et al., 2017; Den Heuvel, 2008)14. Non-listed banks have com-
Table 6
THE EFFECTS OF NPLs AND FINANCIAL STABILITY ON MARGINAL COST, THE 
LERNER INDES AND THE BOONE INDICATOR FOR LITED VS. NON-LISTED BANKS
This table shows the results when a variation in financial stability, defined as the NPL ratio (NPLit) and the natural 
logarithm of the Z-score (Ln(Zit)) regressed against the dependent variables, marginal cost (MCit) in Panel A, the 
Lerner index (Lernerit) in Panel B, and the Boone indicator (Bht) in Panel C. The regressions are estimated using 
high-frequency data. Li is a qualitative variable that takes the value one if bank i is listed and zero otherwise. Specifi-
cations (1), (2), (3) and (4) are estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator for panel data with fixed 
effects for the period 2002Q1-2016Q4. Specifications (5), (6), (7) and (8) are estimated using the Instrumental Va-
riables (IV) estimator for the period 2008Q1-2016Q4. The selected instruments are the NPL ratio (NPLit), the unem-
ployment rate (UNEMh. t−1) and one-quarter-lagged 10-year sovereign CDS (CDSh. t−1) for country h. Instruments 
validated by Sargan test, under the null of exogeneity, checking the lack of correlation between the instruments and 
the error term of the main equation. All the regressions contain control variables and individual fixed effects, and 
the standard errors are clustered by countries. *, **, ***, denote minimum 10 %, 5 %, 1 % significance, respectively.
OLS with fixed effects IV with fixed effects
Li = 1 Li = 0 Li = 1 Li = 0 Li = 1 Li = 0 Li = 1 Li = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Dependent variable: Lerner
it
ΔNPLit -0.547** -0.732** -0.321** -0.363**
(0.183) (0.213) (0.128) (0.139)
ΔLn(Zit) 0.114** 0.161** 0.353*** 0.537***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.044) (0.065)
Sargan test 
[p-value] 0.292 0.239 0.368 0.364
Panel B: Dependent variable: B
ht
ΔNPLit -0.520** -0.569** -0.534*** -0.572***
(0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.121)
ΔLn(Zit) 0.324*** 0.347*** 0.278*** 0.358***
(0.068) (0.080) (0.076) (0.082)
Sargan test 
[p-value] 0.211 0.284 0.302 0.287
Panel C: Dependent variable: MC
ht
ΔNPLit 0.019** 0.024** 0.019*** 0.024***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
ΔLn(Zit) -0.001** -0.002** 0.001** 0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sargan test 
[p-value] 0.824 0.746 0.242 0.250
N 5.160 5.160 5.160 5.160 5.160 5.160 5.160 5.160
X'i, t–1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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paratively fewer options than listed banks do when it comes to raising capital in secondary 
markets, and are forced to obtain funding from deposits, securitization activities and inter-
bank markets. Investors are therefore likely to harbour more doubts about the profitability 
and asset value and to demand more compensation for non-diversifiable risk from non-listed 
than from listed banks. In other words, higher input costs have a greater incremental effect on 
marginal cost and a greater decremental effect on lending in non-listed than in listed banks 
(Chiesa and Mansilla-Fernández, 2018 a, b). As a result, non-listed banks lose more lending 
market share than their competitors, and have to reduce their mark-ups to remain competitive.
5. Conclusions
This paper analyses the sensitivity of lending market competition to variations in the 
NPL ratio and the (inverse) probability of bank default, i. e., financial (in)stability. A unique 
database is constructed for this purpose by combining Bankscope accounting data (Bureau 
van Dijk) with Thomson Reuters Datastream macroeconomic and market data for each coun-
try in the Eurozone.
The main finding of this study is that higher NPL ratios and greater financial instability 
increase the level of competition in lending markets. In line with studies predicting than an 
increase in NPLs will increase banks’ funding costs (Aiyar et al., 2015; Chiesa and Man-
silla-Fernández, 2018 a, b), this paper shows that banks suffer both market share losses and 
mark-up losses due to an increase in marginal cost. The results of this study also suggest 
that market access can compensate for potential capital loss due to an increase in NPLs. To 
be specific, non-listed banks are economically more vulnerable than listed banks to a loss of 
market share.
As far as can be ascertained, this is one of the first studies to analyse the repercussions of 
financial stability for banking market competition. The results are robust to endogeneity tests. 
However, because data on 10-year sovereign CDS are available only from 2008 onwards, the 
analysis of their impact on the NPL ratio is limited to the crisis period. The effects of the sale 
of NPLs on secondary markets and the introduction of sovereign guarantees are issues which 
remain for future research.
Notes
1. European supervisors consider a loan to be doubtful when there are signs that the borrower will be unable 
to repay it within ninety days, not having paid any of the agreed instalments. In the worst case scenario, the 
borrower is unable to repay the loan and the bank has to write the loan off the balance sheet.
2. According to EBA data, in June 2018, the Eurozone countries with the highest non-performing loans ratios are 
Greece (44.81 %), Cyprus (34.12 %), Portugal (12.44 %), Italy (9.73 %), Ireland (7.01 %), and Spain (4.24 %).
3. The Basel -III accord requires banks to hold a minimum capital buffer for withstanding risk.
4. See Giannoccolo and Mansilla-Fernández (2017) for a more thorough review of the literature.
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15. The moral hazard hypothesis predicts that banks with low capital are relatively more prone to generate doubtful 
loans because they are able to increase the level of risk in their credit portfolios (a strategy known as gambling 
to resurrection) (see Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Bouwman and Malmendier, 2015).
16. Under the standard monopolistic competition model, a drop in credit demand can compensate for a possible 
price increase due to a marginal cost increase (see Kolmar, 2017; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). Accornero et 
al. (2017) show that an increase in the variation of the NPL ratio implies a reduction in the demand for loans. 
This result is due to economic slowdown (Balgova et al., 2016, 2018; Ghosh, 2017), the sovereign debt crisis 
(Buch et al., 2016; Podstawski and Velinov, 2018), and deleverage of the real sector during the crisis period 
(BdE, 2017) causing the loan demand curve to shift to the left.
17. Listed banks are usually larger in size, relatively more cost efficient, and have higher levels of market concen-
tration than non-listed banks (e. g., Delis et al., 2017; Meslier et al., 2017; Phan et al., 2018).
18. The Eurozone countries are Germany, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, and Portugal.
19. I am grateful for an anonymous reviewer’s suggestions for calculating the price and the risk-adjusted marginal cost.
10. Jiménez et al. (2013), adopting the approach used by Martín-Oliver et al. (2006), use probability of default data 
(PDit) from the Bank of Spain’s Risk Information Centre.(CIR, for its acronym in). Access to the RIC not being 
possible, this study uses Bankscope accounting data instead.
11. Various studies calculate the leverage ratio as equity over total assets. The inverse enables interpretation of the 
ratio as the liabilities-to-equity ratio. The reasoning for this is as follows:




 12. This mechanism has two component trends associated with the Banking Union: a cyclical component due to recent expectations of economic recovery and a clearing of balance sheets encouraging bankers to start planning 
for the future (Schoenmaker, 2015; Duijm and Schoenmaker, 2017); and a structural component due to the real 
sector’s dependence on bank financing, and the coming Capital Markets Union (Langfield and Pagano, 2016). 
Banks prepare for new competition in the loans market –from mutual funds, pension funds and insurance com-
panies, etc.– by upsizing and pursuing economies of scale through mergers (Evanoff and Ors, 2008).
13. The reader should recall that the higher the value of Zit, the lower bank default risk. This result suggests that 
non-listed banks assumed higher levels of risk than listed banks did during the study period.
14. Under the Basel -III accord, banks are required to hold a tier 1 common capital buffer and a capital conservation 
buffer equivalent to at least 4.5 % and 2.5 %, respectively, of its risk-weighted assets. The following table summa-
rizes the Basel-III reforms. Downloaded December 28, 2018: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/ b3_bank_sup_ 
reforms_es.pdf.
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Resumen
Este trabajo analiza los efectos de la morosidad crediticia y de la (in)estabilidad financiera sobre la 
competencia bancaria en los mercados de crédito de la zona euro. Los resultados sugieren que la mo-
rosidad bancaria incrementa el coste marginal y el grado de competencia de los mercados bancarios. 
Este fenómeno es económicamente más significativo para los bancos no cotizados que para los bancos 
cotizados. Los resultados son robustos a posibles problemas de endogeneidad derivados de la recesión 
económica y de la crisis de deuda soberana sobre el crecimiento de la morosidad.
Palabras clave: Bancos cotizados, competencia bancaria, crisis financiera y bancaria, deuda soberana, 
NPLs.
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